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Antimonopoly in American Politics, 1945-2000 
 
Daniel Scroop 
 
Summary 
Antimonopoly, meaning the exclusive or near-exclusive control of an industry or business by one or 
a very few businesses, played a relatively muted role in the history of the post-1945 era, certainly 
compared to some earlier periods in American history. However, the subject of antimonopoly is 
important because it sheds light on changing attitudes toward concentrated power, corporations, and 
the federal government in the United States after World War II.  
Paradoxically, as antimonopoly declined as a grassroots force in American politics, the 
technical, expert-driven field of antitrust enjoyed a golden age. From the 1940s to the 1960s, antitrust 
operated on principles broadly in line with those that inspired its creation in the late-nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, acknowledging the special contribution small business owners made to US 
democratic culture. In these years, antimonopoly remained sufficiently potent as a political force to 
sustain the careers of national-level politicians such as congressmen Wright Patman and Estes 
Kefauver and to inform the opinions of Supreme Court justices such as Hugo Black and William O. 
Douglas. Antimonopoly and consumer politics overlapped in this period. From the mid-1960s 
onward, Ralph Nader repeatedly tapped antimonopoly ideas in his writings and consumer activism, 
skilfully exploiting popular anxieties about concentrated economic power. At the same time, as part 
of the United States’ rise to global hegemony, officials in the federal government’s Antitrust 
Division exported antitrust overseas, building it into the political, economic, and legal architecture of 
the post-war world. 
Beginning in the 1940s, conservative lawyers and economists launched a counterattack 
against the conception of antitrust elaborated in the progressive era. By making consumer welfare—
understood in terms of low prices and market efficiency—the determining factor in antitrust cases 
they made a major intellectual and political contribution to the rightward thrust of US politics in the 
1970s and 1980s. Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, published in 1978, popularized and signalled 
the ascendency of this new approach.  
In the 1980s and 1990s antimonopoly drifted to the margin of political debate. Fear of big 
government now loomed larger in US politics than the spectre of monopoly or of corporate 
domination. In the late-twentieth century, Americans, more often than not, directed their antipathy 
toward concentrated power in its public, rather than its private, forms. This fundamental shift in the 
political landscape accounts in large part for the overall decline of antimonopoly—a venerable 
American political tradition—in the period 1945-2000. 
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Antimonopoly in American History 
Antimonopoly runs like a thread throughout the course of American history. In the founding era, 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and John Adams attacked monopoly as a moral evil, as did 
Andrew Jackson in the 1820s and 1830s. Before the Civil War, antislavery campaigners, who 
resented the influence wielded by wealthy slave-owning elites, used antimonopoly language when 
campaigning against what they termed the Slave Power. Similarly, late-nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century progressives decried the Money Power, alarmed by the size and power of large 
corporations, and by the entangled relationships between those corporations, big banks, and other 
financial institutions. This long history shows that in the United States antimonopoly has functioned 
as a form of moral politics, a means of raising far-reaching questions about citizenship, community, 
and the proper relationship between democracy and capitalism.  
Antimonopoly remained a feature of US political life in the post-war era but in this period 
became both less visible and less potent. After 1945—and especially after 1970—Americans, 
increasingly, viewed concentrated power in public form as a greater threat than concentrated private 
power. This shift in the locus of popular hostility to concentrated power—from big corporations to 
big government—was a pivotal development in the political history of the twentieth-century United 
States. 
 
Legacies of the New Deal and Second World War 
After the Second World War, antimonopoly gradually receded as a political force. It proved no 
longer capable of mobilising large constituencies of support against concentrated private power. 
Popular opposition to big business ebbed in the 1940s and 1950s in recognition of the fact that the 
war effort, which required government-business cooperation on an unprecedented scale, had 
fundamentally changed the structure of the economy and profoundly refashioned social expectations. 
In a burgeoning mass consumer society, citizens, including veterans returning from war service, 
fixed their attention on enjoying the fruits of a culture of abundance underpinned by products made 
by large corporations. In this context, the problem of monopoly seemed more remote, more abstract, 
than was the case before the war, when the idea that corporate bigness and concentrated private 
power had caused the Great Depression, and contributed to its depth and duration, gained wide 
currency.1 
Even as popular engagement with the problem of monopoly faded, however, antitrust—the 
field of law concerned with policing the relationship between democracy and monopoly—
experienced a golden age. From the 1940s to the 1960s antitrust flourished, operating on principles 
broadly consistent with its nineteenth-century origins: it aimed to promote competition and to foster 
a social and economic environment amenable not only to large enterprises but also to the “small 
dealers and worthy men” Supreme Court Justice Rufus Peckham had singled out as deserving special 
protection in the 1897 case, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association.2 Under the 
leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953-69), the US Supreme Court adopted an energetic 
approach to antitrust. In rulings such as Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (1962) and FTC v. Proctor 
and Gamble (1967) the Warren Court proved willing to prioritize the protection of small business 
over low prices for consumers.3 
The biographies of the first two post-war presidents, Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, show why the idea that “small dealers” deserved special treatment still resonated in the 
post-war era. Both Truman and Eisenhower had strong personal connections to the world of small 
business ownership. In 1919, shortly after returning from war service, Truman opened a 
haberdashery in Kansas City. Following the 1921 recession the enterprise collapsed. Though he later 
came to accept the inevitability of big business domination of major industries such as steel, 
chemicals, electronics, and automobiles, Truman’s chastening experience as a failed retailer gave 
him a lifelong affinity with small business owners.4 The same is true of Eisenhower, whose father, 
David Jacob Eisenhower, owned a general store in Hope, Kansas, in the 1880s. Like Truman’s 
haberdashery, the store went bust. Eisenhower’s farewell address as president, delivered by radio and 
on television in January 1961, communicated the cultural values President Eisenhower imbibed 
during his childhood and youth in Denison, Texas, and Abilene, Kansas. When Ike—the last 
president born in the nineteenth century—warned of the dangers of a “military-industrial complex” 
he expressed the fears of a generation formed before 1920, when most Americans lived either on 
farms or in small towns.5 
If cultural values rooted in late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century rural and small town 
America influenced post-war antimonopoly politics, so too did the political legacies bequeathed by 
the New Deal. In the late 1930s Franklin D. Roosevelt launched a major antitrust drive, responding 
to concerns that giant corporations dominated the US economy to an excessive and dangerous 
degree. This led to a sweeping investigation of monopoly under the auspices of the Temporary 
National Economic Committee (TNEC).6 President Roosevelt made plain his determination to make 
antitrust part of the post-war political and economic order in his January 11, 1944 State of the Union 
address, in which he proposed that the “political rights” laid out in the 1791 Bill of Rights be 
augmented by a second Bill of Rights designed to promote the security and prosperity of US citizens 
“regardless of station, race, or creed.”7 Explaining that the emergence during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century of a large-scale “industrial economy” had altered the nation fundamentally, 
Roosevelt enumerated eight “economic truths” which he presented as “goals of human happiness and 
well-being” for the new post-war world.8 Among them was the “right of every businessman, large 
and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by 
monopolies at home and abroad.”9 [Insert audio clip 1. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the 
Union address.]. 
 
When Truman assumed the presidency he promised to codify Roosevelt’s capacious vision of 
a new economic constitutional order. In a September 6, 1945 message to Congress he repeated 
verbatim his predecessor’s eight “economic truths,” pledging to give small businesses special 
protection even through the war reconversion period.10 Conservative opposition in Congress ensured, 
however, that Truman’s efforts to convert Roosevelt’s ambitious post-war vision—including its 
antitrust component—into legislative form at home floundered. Republican gains in the 1946 
midterm elections stymied Truman’s domestic agenda, but a quite different story unfolded overseas: 
in the 1940s the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice exported antitrust across the globe. 
So successful was this enterprise that by the year 2000 antitrust had become a global phenomenon 
and a fact of life for major corporations no matter where in the world they operated.11 Antitrust, 
which began its life as a uniquely American product, had become by the end of the millennium a 
major factor in late-twentieth-century battles over state sovereignty and the politics of globalization. 
In 2000 around half of the countries signed up to the World Trade Organization (WTO) possessed 
functioning national antitrust legal systems.12  
The origins of this extraordinary global development can be traced to the Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice’s aggressive pursuit of international cartels during and after the Second 
World War. American plans drawn up for the post-war occupation of Germany and Japan restricted 
cartels and took a dim view of big business, implicitly making a connection between tolerance of 
cartels and authoritarian rule.13 In this hostile judicial and political environment, many international 
cartels shut down entirely. The occupying authorities in Germany and Japan carried out a program of 
disbanding and liquidating large companies more comprehensive than anything ever tried in the 
United States.14 In modified form, the US model of antitrust exported to western Europe in the 1940s 
took root and flourished. As Wyatt Wells has shown, it thrived because it formed part of a broader 
program of economic liberalization, and because it was supported by leading European statesmen 
such as Jean Monnet, who understood the American antitrust tradition well.15 In contrast, Japan, with 
its lack of raw materials and limited markets for export, took a different path. On winning back its 
sovereignty in 1953, Japan discarded most of the antitrust provisions imposed upon it during the war. 
It returned thereafter to a more restrictive, and cartel-friendly, economic regime.16 
 
 Antimonopoly and Small Business Advocacy 
From the 1940s to the 1970s critics of monopoly in the judicial and legislative branches of 
government fought hard both to promote antitrust and to shield small business from the perceived 
threat posed by giant corporations. On the US Supreme Court two Roosevelt appointees, Hugo Black 
and William O. Douglas, proved especially hostile to monopoly and sympathetic to antitrust. As an 
Alabama congressman during the Great Depression, Black, who served on the Supreme Court from 
1937 to 1971, campaigned against chain stores on the grounds that they threatened the livelihoods of 
independent merchants. On the bench, Black invariably took a hard line on corporate concentration.17 
Douglas, whose Supreme Court career spanned the period from 1939 to 1975, held the view—
elaborated most famously by Louis D. Brandeis—that corporate size itself represented a danger to 
democracy. Like Black (and Brandeis), Douglas believed that antitrust laws such as the 1890 
Sherman Act and the 1914 Clayton Act had been designed to eliminate substantial concentrations of 
economic power and that small business should be protected even if that protection raised prices for 
consumers.18  
It was in the legislative branch of government, however, that antimonopoly contributed most 
to post-war US politics. Wright Patman’s (D-TX) career shows how critics of monopoly worked 
through congressional committees to shape legislation and influence public debate; Estes Kefauver’s 
(D-TN) demonstrates that in the early post-war years antimonopoly—as a distinct and highly 
malleable political language—could propel a politician into the national spotlight and keep them 
there for a sustained period.  
Patman entered Congress in 1928 and quickly established himself as a friend of small 
business and foe of monopoly.19 In the late twenties and early thirties he led the anti-chain store 
movement in Congress, proposing a punitive national anti-chain store tax, and sponsoring the 1935 
Robinson-Patman Act, a law designed to protect small retailers which was drawn up with direct 
assistance from the National Conference of Independent Businessmen.20 In the 1940s he championed 
various forms of affirmative action for small business, striving to ensure that small dealers won 
military contracts and secured government loans.21 He held his congressional seat until his death in 
March 1976 by which time he had mentored many junior politicians with an interest in antitrust and 
small business affairs. Toward the end of his career he won the admiration of consumer champion 
Ralph Nader, who shared Patman’s low opinion of the Federal Reserve, his interest in consumer 
credit and credit unions, his suspicion of corporate bigness, and his doubts about the democratic 
accountability of big banks, insurance companies, and other large financial institutions. In the late 
1960s Patman and Nader joined forces to campaign against Delaware’s incorporation laws.22 
Patman operated largely behind the scenes as one of a group of legislators who worked the 
halls and committee rooms of Congress to press their antimonopoly agenda before, during, and after 
the Second World War, Emanuel Celler, Joseph C. Mahoney and Paul Douglas among them. Estes 
Kefauver also used congressional committees to pursue antitrust issues but at the same he quite 
ingeniously deployed an antimonopoly mode of politics to engage and arouse the public, building a 
national profile by attacking concentrated power in various forms. His career illuminates the 
possibilities and potential of antimonopoly in post-war politics, underscoring its flexibility as a 
political style. 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, Kefauver, who desperately wanted to be president, mixed 
criticism of monopoly in conventional economic form with assaults on other, non-economic forms of 
unaccountable, concentrated power. He pressed hard for more stringent antitrust enforcement: in 
1950, supported by the Truman administration, he helped secure the passage of the Cellar-Kefauver 
Act. This law revised and tightened Section 7 of the Clayton Act, strengthening regulation of 
corporate mergers with the particular aim of preventing companies from evading antitrust law by 
buying up company assets.23 But Kefauver knew that he could not reach the White House by 
pursuing anti-merger legislation alone. In order to fulfil his presidential ambitions he needed to find 
an issue that complemented his antimonopoly style while also grabbing the public’s attention. He 
found that issue in the specter of organized crime, orchestrated, he claimed, by a shadowy yet all-
powerful mafia.24 
Time magazine called Kefauver’s 1950-51 crime hearings, carried out under the auspices of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, “the Biggest Show on Earth.”25 More people tuned in for the 
televised crime hearings than watched the 1950 World Series.26 Throughout the sensational 
proceedings Kefauver framed the problem of organized crime in antimonopoly terms: he presented 
himself as a lone crusader against concentrated power, battling not just mafia bosses but also the big 
city machines with whom, he alleged, they colluded.27 Like the moralistic early twentieth-century 
progressives who flayed the “Vice Trust” prostitution racket, Kefauver used antimonopoly ideas to 
attack criminal behaviour.28 Indeed the final report of the crime investigation placed the problem of 
monopoly at the heart of its analysis, stating that “the key to successful gang operation is monopoly 
of illicit enterprises, for monopoly guarantees huge profits,” and that “monopoly is the key to big 
money in criminal activity.”29 The hearings made him a serious contender for the Democratic Party’s 
presidential nomination: in 1952 he defeated Harry S. Truman in the New Hampshire primary, 
winning 12 of the 15 primaries he contested in that electoral season; in 1956 he won a remarkable 
victory against Adlai Stevenson in the Minnesota primary before securing his party’s vice 
presidential nomination. He placed antimonopoly at the centre of both campaigns, promising in 1952 
to protect “political democracy” from the deleterious effects of the “concentration of economic 
power,” and arguing in 1956 that a government of “big bankers and miscellaneous other 
millionaires” could not be trusted to run the country.30 
After Eisenhower’s crushing victory in the 1956 presidential election, Kefauver continued his 
fight against monopoly in the Senate. He won control of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly in 1957 and until his death in 1963 used it to attack the size and dominance of big 
corporations. He did so under the guise of an inquiry into administered prices, an economic concept 
referring to prices set and held artificially over time, which was developed during the Great 
Depression by the economist Gardiner Means. Kefauver, however, never accepted Means’s view that 
large corporations were “inevitable and indispensable.”31 Rather, he believed that administered 
prices were a function of monopoly and corporate bigness and that large units should be broken up. 
He criticized another pro-bigness liberal, John Kenneth Galbraith, on these same grounds, arguing 
that economic concentration across a range of major US industries limited consumer choice and 
compromised democracy.32 In this way Kefauver’s hearings revealed divisions among liberals over 
how to approach the problem of large-scale capitalism’s relationship with US democratic culture. 
A notable feature of Kefauver’s political and economic thought is that he saw no conflict 
between opposition to corporate bigness, support for “small dealers,” and consumer advocacy. In fact 
between 1957 and 1963, as his subcommittee investigated every major industry in the United States, 
looking for evidence of collusion, excessive concentration, and price-fixing, he fought at the same 
time to persuade Congress to establish a federal Department of Consumers.33 Taking issue with 
Galbraith, he argued that organized labour could not check the power of big business in the absence 
of effective consumer representation.34 For Kefauver, as for many other congressmen who shared his 
antipathy to monopoly and faith in antitrust, antimonopoly and consumer politics did not clash. 
Kefauver joined forces with congressmen such as Philip Hart, Warren Magnuson, Edmund Muskie, 
Gaylord Nelson and William Proxmire in pursuing antitrust and consumer politics in tandem.35  
 
Ralph Nader, Antimonopoly, and Consumer Politics 
During the 1960s and 1970s, popular attitudes to concentrated power began to shift so that antipathy 
toward big government increasingly superseded antipathy to big corporations as the predominant 
expression of Americans’ fear of concentrated power. For the remainder of the twentieth century, 
this change in the political landscape substantially reduced antimonopoly’s force and viability. 
Indeed Ronald Reagan twice won the presidency in the 1980s promising to reduce the size and 
power of the federal government. In doing so he took advantage of a popular suspicion of 
concentrated public power that he and other conservative politicians had carefully cultivated. In his 
first inaugural address, delivered on January 20, 1981, Reagan declared: “government is not the 
solution to our problem; government is the problem.”36 Although this simplistic statement masked 
the complexity of the American people’s relationship with the central state, and of their 
understanding of the proper role and functions of the federal government, it tapped into powerful 
feelings of hostility toward bigness in governmental form. 
From the 1970s, a new generation of corporate-friendly Democrats, relaxed about bigness 
and comfortable with large-scale capitalism, moved to acknowledge widespread popular distrust of 
the size of the federal government, distancing the Democratic Party from its antimonopoly past. In 
1996 a Democratic president, Bill Clinton, proclaimed in his State of the Union address that “the era 
of big government is over.”37 In the 1990s, New Democrats such as Clinton and his vice president Al 
Gore, Jr. paid little heed to antitrust, let alone antimonopoly. In fact the 1992 and 1996 Clinton-Gore 
campaigns were the first Democratic Party presidential campaigns in the twentieth century based on 
platforms with no antitrust plank. Gore’s contributions in those campaigns bore little resemblance to 
those made by his father, Al Gore Sr. (D-TN), in the 1950s and 1960s, when he frequently joined 
Estes Kefauver’s antimonopoly crusades, lending him his support in the Senate. At the turn of the 
millennium, attacks on antimonopoly occupied a marginal position in US politics. In contrast, despite 
dissenting voices in the consumer, environmental, and anti-globalization movements, a broad 
consensus adhered to the notion that government, rather than corporations, had grown too large and 
too powerful.  
One prominent critic of monopoly merits special attention here because of the role he played 
in fashioning new, unconventional ways of critiquing corporate bigness in the late-twentieth 
century—the consumer advocate Ralph Nader. It is an irony of Nader’s career that he should be so 
well known for one his least successful campaigns: the 2000 presidential bid in which the less than 2 
percent of votes he won in Florida influenced, perhaps even directly, the outcome of the one of the 
closest election results in US history, a result ultimately determined in George W. Bush’s favour by 
the Supreme Court.38 But the 2000 campaign is also significant for highlighting just how hostile the 
political climate had become for a critic of large-scale capitalism such as Nader. Running on the 
Green Party ticket, Nader hammered antimonopoly themes throughout the 2000 campaign, explicitly 
linking himself to the legacy of the nineteenth-century Populists, but his message never resonated 
with more than a small portion of the electorate.39 Only after the 2009 global financial crisis, which 
prompted the brief flowering of the Occupy Movement and then led to the emergence of Elizabeth 
Warren (D-MA) and Bernie Sanders (Ind-VT) as major national figures, did the general political 
climate become more congenial to opponents of concentrated economic power.  
Nader is not conventionally understood as an antimonopoly politician, but his preoccupation with 
the problem of concentrated power in economic form has been a constant theme across the fifty-year 
span of his public life. Nader’s early writings on automobile safety identified the bigness of 
corporations such as General Motors as particularly troublesome. The automobile “industry’s 
biggest safeguard is its very bigness and power,” he wrote in a 1963 essay for The Nation.40 His 
sensational assault on General Motors, Unsafe at Any Speed, published in 1965, took aim at the 
biggest of the “Big Three” automobile manufacturers. On the surface it merely drew attention to 
some problems in automobile design and their safety ramifications but it also raised fundamental 
questions about democracy’s relationship to large-scale capitalism. Nader’s muckraking classic 
depicted General Motors as an unaccountable “giant” or “goliath,” a malevolent entity representing 
concentrated economic power in monstrous form.41 Unsafe at Any Speed launched Nader’s career as 
a consumer advocate but, more than that, it established him as the most prominent and effective 
critic of monopoly operating in the last three decades of the twentieth century. [Insert figure 1. 
Figure 1. Ralph Nader in 1975. By the mid-seventies, consumer advocate Nader had established 
himself as the most popular and high-profile critic of big corporations in the United States. 
Photographer Thomas J. O’Halloran.] 
 
The fact that Nader forged his career without being elected to any office, working instead 
through the media, as well as through a host of advocacy, lobbying, and investigatory groups of his 
own devising, testifies both to his entrepreneurial ability and to how far from the political 
mainstream antimonopoly had drifted by the end of the twentieth century.42 Much of the intellectual 
and political work responsible for the antimonopoly’s drift from the political mainstream in the last 
decades of the twentieth was carried out, largely hidden from public view, by a cluster of lawyers 
and economists based at the University of Chicago in the 1940s and 1950s. In time, their labours, 
which began to blossom and bear fruit politically in the 1970s and 1980s, transformed how lawyers 
and economists understood monopoly. By the end of the twentieth century they had succeeded in 
killing off the late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century conception of antitrust—a conception 
cherished by many liberals and progressives—as means of preserving a democratic order rooted in 
competition among small businesses. 
 
The Chicago School and the Transformation of Antitrust 
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the University of Chicago became a major hub 
for a form of pro-market thought which came to be known as neoliberalism. In this particular 
historical context, neoliberalism—a useful but notoriously unstable and contested term—involved 
the notion that, in contrast to classical liberalism, the conditions for the success of a free market 
economy needed to be constructed through positive political action.43 Indeed in the 1940s and 1950s 
the Chicago School cohered more completely around this political commitment, rooted in the desire 
to develop a form of liberalism sufficiently robust to fend off the challenge of left-wing 
totalitarianism, than around any economic theory or abstraction.44 As Angus Burgin has shown, mid-
twentieth century neoliberals held a range of views and often disagreed among themselves.45 
Nevertheless, antitrust—and more broadly the relationship between monopoly and democracy—
formed an indispensable part of the neoliberal attempt to promote pro-market ideas. 
One of the leading figures in the early history of the Chicago School, Henry C. Simons, took 
the classically liberal view that monopoly was inimical to democracy. He believed that monopoly 
had helped bring about the Great Depression and opposed concentrated power “in all its forms: 
gigantic corporations, trade associations,” and “trade-unions.”46 Soon, however, Simons’ classical 
view of monopoly was supplanted by an alternative pro-market perspective as relaxed about 
concentrated private power as it was hostile to concentrated public power. Seeking to counter left-
wing arguments that monopoly control of the economy was best remedied through state ownership 
not free market competition, the Austrian-born economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek 
established first the Free Market Study group (1946-1952) then the Antitrust Project (1953-1957) to 
re-examine the monopoly question.47 The result, by the early 1950s, was a more or less complete 
volte face, a renunciation of Simons’s classical liberalism by this group of influential pro-market 
thinkers, and a corresponding insistence that since competition tended to destroy monopoly, 
economists, lawyers, and policymakers should adopt a tolerant view of both monopoly and big 
corporations.48 
In the 1950s, the notion that the forces of competition corroded monopoly and that large 
corporations did not pose a threat to the workings of a free market economy was still a fringe 
position. But like many other views associated with the Chicago School, it gradually gained traction, 
thanks in part to skilled communicators such as Milton Friedman whose books and television 
appearances did so much through the second half of the twentieth century to disseminate neoliberal 
ideas to the public.49 But the key figure in popularising the Chicago School’s ideas on monopoly and 
antitrust was not Friedman but Robert Bork.  
Bork studied law as an undergraduate and postgraduate at the University of Chicago, gaining 
his J.D. in 1953. He then stayed on as a contributor to the Antitrust Project, inspired by Hayek and 
led by Milton Friedman’s brother-in-law, Aaron Director, another leading figure in the Chicago 
School. In 1954 Bork published an influential article on vertical integration; he then left academia to 
work for a corporate law firm.50 He moved back into academia in 1962, however, securing a position 
at Yale Law School, where, in the 1970s, he wrote The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with 
Itself, the book that did more than any other to popularize the emerging neoliberal consensus on 
antitrust.51  
The Antitrust Paradox advanced the Chicago School idea that consumer welfare, understood 
in terms of the allocative efficiency of markets and their capacity to deliver low prices, should be the 
sole factor in determining the outcome of antitrust cases. “The judge must not weigh against 
consumer welfare any other goal,” Bork wrote, “such as the supposed benefits of preserving small 
business against superior efficiency.”52 Bork’s book made a serious, scholarly intervention in a major 
field of American law and has been used to support the reasoning of numerous Supreme Court cases, 
but it adopted a strikingly polemical, even alarmist, tone. In one passage, for instance, Bork claimed 
that “modern antitrust has so decayed that the policy is no longer intellectually respectable.”53 
A comparison between the first (1978) and second (1993) editions of The Antitrust Paradox 
illustrates the success of the Chicago School’s politically-charged refashioning of antitrust. In his 
1993 preface, Bork apologized for the angry tone of his first edition. He had been too prickly and 
pessimistic, he explained, because he had not realized at the time that he and his allies had already 
won the battle to revolutionize antitrust.54 With the “primitive egalitarianism” of the Warren Court 
consigned to the past, he wrote, he could now see that his work was done.55 Lawyers and judges now 
used the insights of the Chicago School in antitrust cases, he explained, deploying specified modes 
of economic analysis to test and refine their understanding of the antitrust laws in relation to 
consumer welfare, understood in terms of low prices and market efficiency. Bork also claimed—
quite disingenuously—that the sea change in antitrust he helped to bring about was not political, but 
rather purely an intellectual advance.56 In fact, the redefinition of antitrust, originating in the Chicago 
School in the late 1940s and early 1950s, was a pivotal time in the development of modern 
conservatism. By dismantling the antitrust tradition—or at least by transforming it in ways that 
served their political ends—Robert Bork and his allies at the University of Chicago and elsewhere 
made a significant contribution to the rightward shift in American politics which accelerated in the 
1970s and held firm for the rest of the twentieth century.57 
 
Antimonopoly and Popular Hostility to Concentrated Power 
In an important sense, the history of antimonopoly in the post-war United States is one of decline. 
Richard Hofstadter made this point in 1964 when, in an influential essay, he argued that antitrust had 
ceased to excite the passions of the American people and had instead become the sole preserve of 
experts.58 Large-scale capitalism won broad acceptance after the Second World War as Americans, 
for the most part, embraced a consumer-oriented political and social order. As Estes Kefauver and 
Ralph Nader showed in their contrasting ways, it remained possible to forge a significant, national-
level political career by exploiting popular hostility to corporate bigness, but no grassroots 
antimonopoly movement emerged comparable to late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
Populism or even to Huey Long’s New Deal-era Share Our Wealth movement.59 
But in US history, antimonopoly operated—as it operates still—as a form of moral politics: it 
gives the American people an outlet for their deep-seated aversion to concentrated power. In this 
sense it is a subset of a broader political phenomenon, or impulse, rather than a discrete tradition. 
After all, opposition to concentrated power can take many forms. It can direct itself toward various 
targets, not only those associated with economic monopoly. In light of this fact it may be that in the 
second half of the twentieth century the American propensity to oppose concentrated power did not 
so much decline as change form. Between 1945 and 2000, and for reasons future historians will want 
to explore in greater depth, popular hostility to concentrated power expressed itself predominantly in 
terms of antipathy toward concentrated public rather than private power. It took aim at bureaucrats 
rather than bankers, at Washington rather than Wall Street, and at big government rather than large 
corporations. 
 
Discussion of the Literature 
Two recently published volumes of essays provide useful introductions to current scholarship at the 
intersection of US political and business history: Richard R. John and Kim Phillips-Fein, eds, 
Capital Gains: Business and Politics in Twentieth-Century America (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016) and Kim Phillips-Fein and Julian E. Zelizer, eds, What’s Good for 
Business: Business and American Politics since World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012). Richard Hofstadter’s characteristically subtle essay, “What Happened to the Antitrust 
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